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A B S T R A C T
Wild bird migration and illegal trade of infected poultry, eggs, and poultry products have been associated with the spread of avian influenza viruses (AIV). During
1992–1996, H7N1 and H7N8 low pathogenic AIV (LPAIV) were identified from captive wild birds; such as Pekin robin (Leiothrix lutea), magpie robin (Copsychus
saularis), flycatcher sp. (genus Empidonax), a species of softbill and parakeet, sun conure (Aratinga solstitialis), painted conure (Pyrrhura picta), fairy bluebird (Irena
puella), and common iora (Aegithina tiphia), kept in aviaries or quarantine stations in England, The Netherlands, Singapore and the United States (U.S.). In this study,
we sequenced these H7 viruses isolated from quarantine facilities and aviaries using next-generation sequencing and conducted a comparative phylogenetic analysis
of complete genome sequences to elucidate spread patterns. The complete genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis suggested that H7 viruses originated from a
common source, even though they were obtained from birds in distant geographical regions. All H7N1 and H7N8 viruses were LPAIV, except a H7N1 highly
pathogenic AIV (HPAIV), A/Pekin robin/California/30412/1994(H7N1) virus. Our results support the continued need for regulation of the captive wild bird trade to
reduce the risk of introduction and dissemination of both LPAIV and HPAIV throughout the world.
1. Introduction
Whereas historically pathogen spillover events were likely to remain
local, even undetected due to natural, cultural and geographic barriers,
globalized trade of domestic and wild animals allows infectious diseases
to spread along various globally connected networks in a matter of days
(Smith et al., 2017). It has been reported that trade of infected birds,
eggs, and poultry products have caused the spread of avian influenza
viruses (AIV) (Vandegrift et al., 2010). For example, the detection of
Asian-origin H5N1 highly pathogenic AIV (HPAIV) in eagles con-
fiscated at Brussels Airport, Belgium, which were smuggled from
Thailand, and in captive-caged birds held in quarantine in England
imported from Taiwan during 2004–2005 and in smuggled cage birds
originating from Indonesia detected at Vienna airport, Austria in 2013,
represent this important dissemination route of AIV around the world
(Capua and Alexander, 2007; Ronquist et al., 2012). The dissemination
of low pathogenic AIV (LPAIV), mainly H3, H4 and H7 subtypes, via
international captive bird trade during the 1970s–1990s, also highlights
the risk for intercontinental spread of AIV through trade in such birds
(Alexander, 1995; Banks et al., 2000; Panigrahy and Senne, 1997). In
particular, H7N1 LPAIV was identified from Passeriformes and Psitta-
ciformes birds; such as sun conure (Aratinga solstitialis), painted conure
(Pyrrhura picta), fairy bluebird (Irena puella), common iora (Aegithina
tiphia), and a species of parakeet kept in aviaries or quarantine in
England, the Netherlands and Singapore during 1994–1995 (Banks
et al., 2000). In the United States (U.S.), H7N1 and H7N8 viruses were
detected from exotic birds such as Pekin robin (Leiothrix lutea), magpie
robin (Copsychus saularis), flycatcher sp. (genus Empidonax), and a
species of softbill, intended for importation into the U.S. during
1992–1996 (Panigrahy and Senne, 1997). The phylogeographic origin,
epidemiologic linkages and reassortment of gene segments of these
viruses are unknown.
The deduced amino acid profile at the HA cleavage site for the
H7N1 and H7N8 viruses identified from Passeriformes and
Psittaciformes birds were consistent with that of LPAIV and found to be
non-pathogenic for chickens, except for the A/Pekin robin/California/
30412/1994(H7N1) (Pekin robin/94) virus. The presence of polybasic
amino acids at the cleavage site of HA is characteristic of HPAIV of the
H5 and H7 subtypes which causes systemic virus replication and high
mortality in poultry. The Pekin robin/94 virus met the molecular
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criterion for classification as HPAIV with an amino acid sequence of
PEIPKRRR/G, but was not highly lethal in in vivo chicken pathotyping
test (Senne et al., 1996).
In this study, we sequenced H7N1 and H7N8 viruses identified from
exotic birds during 1992–1994 using next-generation sequencing
(NGS). Molecular epidemiological approaches based on genome se-
quences of these viruses were used to describe the phylogeographic
origin and potential epidemiological linkages. In addition, we analyzed
the cleavage site sequences of HA gene of Pekin robin/94 using deep-
sequencing looking for evidence of mixed infections of LPAIV and
HPAIV strains to explain the disparity of low pathogenicity phenotype
and high pathogenicity genotype in the previous report. Also, we re-
peated the in vivo chicken pathogenicity test.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Genome sequencing
Complete genomes of 11 H7N1 and 2 H7N8 viruses listed in Table 1
(seven isolates detected from exotic birds in quarantine facility in Ca-
lifornia during 1992–1994, five isolates from Animal and Plant Health
Agency in Weybridge, United Kingdom submitted from England, The
Netherlands and Singapore during 1994–1995, and an isolate detected
from a bird in a quarantine facility in Canada during 1994) were se-
quenced using illunina MiSeq (Illumina) or Ion Torrent Personal
Genome Machine (Life Technologies) as previously described (Lee
et al., 2017a). The de novo and directed assembly of genome sequences
were performed using Geneious 9.1.2 (http://www.geneious.com) and
GALAXY software as previously described (Dimitrov et al., 2017). As-
sembled sequence data were analyzed to find subpopulation using
Geneious v8.1.2 program as previously described (Lee et al., 2017b).
Nucleotide sequences have been deposited in GenBank under accession
no.MH574746-69 and MH558685-92.
2.2. Phylogenetic analysis
On the basis of BLAST (http://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi)
searches of H7N1 and H7N8 viruses, reference sequences for phyloge-
netic analysis were retrieved from GenBank. AIV sequences that origi-
nated from samples collected before 1995 were downloaded from the
National Center for Biotechnology Information Influenza Virus
Resource database in June 2018 and added to sequence alignments.
Sequences were aligned using Multiple Alignment with Fast Fourier
Transformation (MAFFT) in Geneious v8.1.2 program and trimmed to
remove nucleotides that were outside the coding region. Relationships
were inferred from maximum-likelihood (ML) phylogenies for each
gene segment with RAxML (Stamatakis, 2014) using the GTR nucleo-
tide substitution model and visualized with MEGA 7 software (se-
quences per segment: PB2=172; PB1=179; PA=192; HA=88;
NP=146; N1= 97; N7=71; N8=81; M=239; and NS=175).
Bootstrap support values were generated using 1000 rapid bootstrap
replicates and shown next to the branches (> 70). Based on ML phy-
logenetic analyses of all eight genes, we classified the H7 viruses into
different genotypes according to tree topology, high bootstrap values
(> 70%), and high levels of nucleotide identity (> 95–97%).
The Bayesian relaxed clock phylogenetic analysis of the HA gene
was conducted using BEAST v1.8.3 (Drummond and Rambaut, 2007).
The temporal signal estimated by TempEst software (available online:
http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/tempest/) exhibited a positive cor-
relation between genetic divergence and sampling time and appeared to
be suitable for phylogenetic molecular clock analysis in BEAST (Cor-
relation coefficient: 0.9249, R squared: 0.8555). We used an un-
correlated lognormal distribution relaxed clock method, the HKY nu-
cleotide substitution model and the GMRF Bayesian skyride coalescent
prior (Minin et al., 2008). A Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method to sample trees and evolutionary parameters was run for
5.0× 107 generations. At least three independent chains were com-
bined to ensure adequate sampling of the posterior distribution of trees.
Convergence of the each run and the sufficient effective sample size
(> 200) were confirmed using Tracer version 1.6 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.
uk/software/tracer/). BEAST output was analyzed with 10% burn-in. A
maximum clade credibility (MCC) tree was generated for each data set
using TreeAnnotator in BEAST (http://beast.bio.ed.ac.uk/
TreeAnnotator/). FigTree 1.4.3 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/
figtree/) was used for visualization of MCC tree and the time to the
most recent common ancestor (tMRCA) of each clade was estimated.
2.3. In vivo pathogenicity test
We pathotyped the Pekin robin/94 and A/Avian/Canada/IM-1474/
1994(H7N1) viruses in chickens to confirm the pathogenicity pheno-
type. The Pekin robin/94 isolates were obtained from the National
Veterinary Services Laboratories in Ames, Iowa. The isolates were re-
ceived in allantoic fluid after a single passage in embryonating chicken
eggs (ECE), and further propagated by one additional passage at the
U.S. National Poultry Research Center (USNPRC) to make working
stocks of the viruses. Working stocks were titrated in ECE using stan-
dard methods [25]. All virus titers were reported as mean embryo in-
fectious dose (EID50). The studies were performed in biosecurity level-3
enhanced (BSL-3E) facilities in accordance with procedures approved
by the USNPRC Institutional Biosecurity Committee. The Pekin robin/
94 virus was pathotyped by intravenous inoculation in eight 4-week-old
White Plymouth Rock (WPR) chickens as previously described (OIE,
2018). Isolates that killed more than six chickens within 10 days were
categorized as HPAIV. In addition, a group of eight chickens was in-
tranasally (IN)-inoculated with 106.8 EID50 of infectious allantoic fluid
to determine virulence by simulated natural exposure route. To eval-
uate the mean chicken infectious dose (CID50), birds were divided into
Table 1
Viruses used in this study.
Virus Found in Origin of birds HA cleavage site In vivo pathogenicity (Reference)
A/softbill/California/33445-158/1992(H7N1) Quarantine facility Unknown PETPKGR/G Low (Panigrahy and Senne, 1997)
A/softbill/California/33445-136/1992(H7N1) Quarantine facility Unknown PETPKGR/G Low (Panigrahy and Senne, 1997)
A/magpie_robin/California/028709-5/1993(H7N8) Quarantine facility China PEIPKER/G Low (Panigrahy and Senne, 1997)
A/magpie_robin/California/028710-14/1993(H7N8) Quarantine facility China PEIPKER/G Low (Senne et al., 1996)
A/Pekin_robin/California/30412/1994(H7N1) Quarantine facility China PEIPKRRR/G Low (Senne et al., 1996), High (this study)
A/softbill/California/13907-21/1994(H7N1) Quarantine facility Indonesia PEIPKGR/G Low (Senne et al., 1996)
A/flycatcher/California/014875-1/1994(H7N1) Quarantine facility Indonesia PEIPKGR/G Low (Senne et al., 1996)
A/Avian/Canada/IM-1474/1994(H7N1) Quarantine facility Unknown PEIPKGR/G Low (this study)
A/sun conure/England/766/1994(H7N1) Dead, Private aviary Unknown PEIPKGR/G Low (Banks et al., 2000)
A/painted conure/England/1234/1994(H7N1) Dead, Private aviary Unknown PETPKGR/G Low (Banks et al., 2000)
A/parakeet/Netherlands/267497/1994(H7N1) Dead, Private aviary Unknown PEIPKGR/G Low (Banks et al., 2000)
A/fairy_bluebird/Singapore/F92/1994(H7N1) Bird destined for export Singapore PEIPKGR/G Low (Banks et al., 2000)
A/common_iora/Singapore/F89/95(H7N1) Smuggled bird Indonesia PEIPKGR/G Low (Banks et al., 2000)
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groups of 8 birds, and each bird was IV-inoculated with 102, 104, or 106
EID50 in 0.1ml of infectious allantoic fluid. The intravenous patho-
genicity index (IVPI) of A/Avian/Canada/IM-1474/1994(H7N1) was
performed at the Canadian Food Inspection Agency according to the
standard procedures (OIE, 2018).
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Dissemination of reassortant H7 viruses via bird trade
A total of six distinct genotypes, genotype I-VI, were identified
(Fig. 1), suggesting H7 viruses seem to have acquired their gene seg-
ments from different gene pools of Eurasian and North American LPAIV
through reassortment (Fig. S2) and these genotypes may have co-cir-
culated (Fig. 2 and S1). All genes of genotype III and IV viruses, except
polymerase genes, shared high nucleotide identity (> 97.6%) and
phylogenetically clustered at each gene segment with those of genotype
I. Among all 8 segments, only the PB2 gene of genotype III did not share
high nucleotide identity (88.5–89.1%) with Genotype IV. Based on the
estimated tMRCA of HA gene (Fig. 2 and S1), H7 viruses sequenced as
part of this study and an additional reference sequence from China
likely diversified into genotype I-VI since 1984 March (95% Bayesian
credible interval [BCI]: 1981 May – 1986 Aug, posterior probability:
0.99). The HA gene of genotype I-IV clustered together in Bayesian
phylogenetic tree. The estimated tMRCA between genotype I-IV was
1989 February (95% BCI: 1986 Nov – 1990 Dec, posterior probability:
1.0). The HA gene of genotype V and VI clustered together and their
tMRCA was estimated as 1986 August (95% BCI: 1984 May – 1988 Apr,
posterior probability: 1.0). Between genotype V and VI, only HA, M and
NS genes were clustered together (Fig. 1 and S2). The NP gene of A/non
psittacine/England Q/1985/1989(H7N7) virus clustered with North
American lineage LPAIV (Fig. S2). Interestingly, the PB2 gene of gen-
otype IV appeared later in the Asian H9N2 LPAIV circulating in poultry.
The PB2 gene of genotype IV phylogenetically clustered with H9N2
viruses identified in Middle East from 1999 and shared high nucleotide
identity (97.4–97.7%) with the A/chicken/Middle East/ED-1/
1999(H9N2) virus.
Our ML and Bayesian phylogenies of HA gene provided support for
common ancestry between genotype I-IV viruses. The oldest virus in
genotype I-IV cluster is A/duck/Nanchang/1904/1992(H7N1) showing
the shortest branch length from the common ancestral node.
Unfortunately, there are no full-length HA gene sequences that cluster
with genotype V-VI available in the public databases; however, two
H7N1 viruses identified from a quarantine station in California, A/
softbill/California/33445-136/1992(H7N1) and A/softbill/CA/33445-
158/1992(H7N1), share 99.1% nucleotide identity (110 of 111) with
the 111 nt long partial HA gene of A/softbill/China/92(H7) virus
(Banks et al., 1995). These data suggests that nine isolates identified
from quarantine stations in California, Canada, and Singapore, and
private aviaries in England and the Netherlands during 1994 most
likely have been disseminated separately from a common origin pos-
sibly in Asia even though they were isolated from distant geographical
regions. The isolations from quarantine stations in California and Sin-
gapore were from birds imported from China and Indonesia (Banks
et al., 2000). The isolations in private aviaries in England and the
Netherlands were from dead sun and painted conures, and parakeet, but
the country of origin for these birds remains uncertain although the
captive bird trade was theoretically banned at the time (Banks et al.,
1995). During the period from 1981 to 2010, the live pet bird trades
exported from China exceeded one million individual birds in contrast
to approximately 80,000 individual birds imported to China during the
same period (Li and Jiang, 2014). Parrots and passerines were the most
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Fig. 1. Genome constellations of H7 viruses. Viruses are represented by ovals containing horizontal bars that represent the 8 influenza gene segments (from top to
bottom: polymerase basic 2, polymerase basic 1, polymerase acidic, hemagglutinin, nucleoprotein, neuraminidase, matrix, and nonstructural) Each gene segment was
colour coded according to the genetic clustering in ML phylogenetic trees. A highly pathogenic avian influenza virus, the Pekin robin/CA/30412/94, is colored in red.
Asterisk indicates the gene belongs to North American lineage. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)
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common birds in trade: live bird exports from China were directed to
Europe, Southeast Asia, Japan and the U.S., while exports from Africa
and Southeast Asia were directed into China. Our phylogenetic analysis
and bird trade data suggest that reassortant H7 viruses were co-circu-
lating in captive bird populations in Southeast Asia and China, and
dissemination of these viruses via export activities into multiple coun-
tries.
3.2. Pathogenicity of Pekin robin/94 virus
NGS confirmed that the deduced amino acid sequence for the H7
viruses isolated from captive birds during 1989–1995 bore two non-
consecutive basic amino acids at the cleavage site (PEIPKER/G or
PETPKGR/G [Table 1]), consistent with LPAIV, except for Pekin robin/
94 virus. The Pekin robin/94 virus possessed multiple basic amino acids
at the cleavage site (PEIPKRRR/G), likely representing mutation from
an LPAIV motif through both non-synonymous substitution (single
nucleotide polymorphism), and insertion of an additional basic amino
acid. All viruses were LPAIV based on the HA cleavage site sequences
and in vivo chicken testing in the present and previous studies (Banks
et al., 2000; Panigrahy and Senne, 1997; Senne et al., 1996), except for
Pekin robin/94 virus. In this study, the Pekin robin/94 virus was highly
lethal in chicken pathotyping tests (Table 2). It produced high mor-
bidity (8/8) and mortality (7/8) in IV-inoculated chickens. Mean death
time (MDT) was 4.4 and 5.6 days in trial 1 and 2, respectively for
chickens IN-inoculated with the 106.0 EID50 dose. In the group in-
oculated with 104.0 EID50 dose, all chickens showed clinical signs and
six chickens died, with a MDT of 5.3 days. In 102.0 EID50 virus dose
inoculated group, seven chickens showed clinical signs and six chickens
died, with a MDT of 6.7 days. The mean CID50 was<102.0 EID50
suggesting being highly adapted to the chicken host (Swayne and
Slemons, 2008). The high pathogenicity of Pekin robin/94 virus pro-
duced in this study corresponds to the HA0 cleavage site sequences. The
mean depth of coverage at the HA0 cleavage site was>1000 which is
sufficient to identify a variant with high confidence. None of the NGS
read had the LPAIV motif at the HA0 cleavage site of Pekin robin/94
virus. It is unclear why the Pekin robin/94 virus had a low patho-
genicity phenotype in the prior study while our study determined it was
highly lethal for chickens and on NGS sequencing had an HA cleavage
site of a high pathogenicity virus without a subpopulation of LPAIV.
Historically, LPAIV mutation at the HA0 cleavage site to HPAIV has
most consistently occurred in gallinaceous poultry with rare identifi-
cation of HPAIV in non-gallinaceous species (Mathilde et al., 2017).
However, with the Pekin Robin HPAIV, it remains unclear whether this
HA0 mutation occurred during the infection cycle in this passerine
species, or if the mutation occurred in gallinaceous poultry with ex-
posure and transmission to the passerines prior to capture and/or
during holding and trading.
Fig. 2. Selected subtree of relaxed clock molecular phylogenetic tree for the hemagglutinin of H7 viruses. The phylogenetic relationships and temporal evolutionary
history have been estimated by molecular clock analysis. The tree is scaled to the time (horizontal axis), with blue horizontal bars at nodes representing the 95%
highest posterior density intervals for the node ages. Genotype of each virus is indicated next to taxa. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 2
Pathogenicity of the A/Pekin robin/CA/30412/1994(H7N1) virus in chickens.
Route Dose (EID50) Mortality Morbidity Mean death time (days)
Intravenous 106.8 7/8 8/8 4.4
106.0 8/8 8/8 4.4
104.0 6/8 8/8 5.3
102.0 6/8 7/8 6.7
Intranasal 106.8 4/8 6/8 6.3
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4. Conclusion
During the last decade, migratory aquatic birds, especially in the
orders Anseriformes and Charadriiformes, have been intensively mon-
itored for influenza A viruses to better understand their role in the
dissemination of A/goose/Guangdong/1/96 (H5N1) lineage H5 HPAIV
over vast geographic distances (Machalaba et al., 2015). Our results
highlight the risk of the live bird trade in other orders of birds which
could be one of the possible routes for the introduction and dis-
semination of both LPAIV and HPAIV throughout the world. Many
countries of origin for legal and illegal wildlife imports to the U.S. in-
clude “hotspots” of HPAIV, as well as other economically important
livestock diseases (Smith et al., 2017). Based on the reported countries
of origin from 2000 to 2013 for all declared US wildlife imports by
shipment, China and Southeast Asia are primary regions of origin for US
wildlife imports. Examples of identified live birds imported from these
regions to the US included nearly 30 million live pheasants from China,
and approximately 450,000 finch-like live pet birds from Taiwan, and
over 85,000 kg of “edible-nest swiftlet” nests from Indonesia (Smith
et al., 2017). In addition, LPAIV and HPAIV have been detected in in-
tercepted illegal imported poultry and related products; for example,
HPAIV (H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1c and H5N6 clade 2.3.4.4) and LPAIV
(H9N2 and H1N2) were isolated from raw chicken and duck products
carried by flight passengers from China and Taiwan to Japan during
2015 (Shibata et al., 2018). To minimize the risk of LPAIV and HPAIV
introduction, strict testing, quarantine controls and monitoring for AIV
should be continued for the importation of live poultry, and exotic and
pet birds; fertile eggs and avian products before entering the country.
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